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A SURVEY OF TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT
DEATH PENALTY CASES IN THE 1990s
PENNY

J. WHITE*

Since September 1990, the Tennessee Supreme Court has ruled on
nineteen death penalty cases.' Those cases have required the court to
interpret seven of the twelve aggravating circumstances set forth in the
Tennessee death penalty statute.2 Additionally, the court has considered the
constitutionality of Tennessee's death penalty in light of two federal and
three state constitutional provisions.3 This Article will review those
nineteen cases, their interpretation of statutory aggravating circumstances,
and their impact on state constitutional jurisprudence.

*

Judge, Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. J.D. 1981, University of Tennessee;

LL.M. 1987, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. See State v. Hutchison, No. 03S-01-9108-CR-00078, 1994 WL 242632 (Tenn.
June 7, 1994); State v. Keen, No. 02S01-9112-CR-0064, 1994 WL 198625 (Tenn. May 23,
1994); State v. Stephenson, 1994 WL 175096 (Tenn. May 9, 1994); State v. Nichols, No. 03S-01-9105CR00047, 1994 WL 162134 (Tenn. May 2, 1994); State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561
(Tenn. 1993); State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 . Ct. 1339
(1994); State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465 (Tenn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1577
(1994); State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 561 (1993); State v.
Branam, 855 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526 (Tenn.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 475 (1993); State v. Hurley, No. 34, 1994 WL 131554 (Tenn. Apr. 5,
1993); State v. Bane, 853 S.W.2d 483 (Tenn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 682 (1994);
State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 1840, and
cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 651 (1993); State v. Hale, 840 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. 1992); State
v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1368 (1993); State v. Evans,
838 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 740 (1994); State v. Brown, 836
S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. 1992); State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991); State v. Terry, 813
S.W.2d 420 (Tenn. 1991).
2. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i) (Supp. 1993).
3. See U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV; TENN. CONST. art. I, §§ 8,
16, 19. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: "[Nior shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
...the equal protection of laws." See infra notes 4-6 for the text of the Tennessee provisions.
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STATE CONSTITUTION

Opponents of the death penalty have frequently relied upon three
provisions of the state constitution to urge invalidation of the Tennessee4
death penalty statute: (1) Article I, Section 8, the law of the land clause;
(2) Article I, Section 16, the cruel and unusual punishment clause;5 and (3)
Article I, Section 19, the jury's right to determine the law clause.6
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
With regard to Article I, Section 16-the Tennessee Constitution's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment-the majority of the court
has repeatedly rejected per se challenges, holding that the death penalty
statute survives constitutional scrutiny under the analysis utilized in Gregg
v. Georgia.7 Equating the standards of Article I, Section 16 to those of the
Eighth Amendment, the Tennessee Supreme Court held in a three-two
decision, State v. Black,8 that the death penalty conforms with "'contemporary standards of decency,"' is not "'grossly disproportionate"' to firstdegree murder, and does not exceed that punishment "'necessary to
accomplish any legitimate penological objective."' 9 Thus, the majority
concluded that the question is "'in the last analysis, a moral question which
has been resolved ...

by our Legislature as the representative of the

people."' 1 Since its release, Black has replaced State v. Dicks1 as the
precedent for quick resolution of claims that the death penalty is a per se
violation of the state constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.12

4. This clause provides: "That no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of
his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or
deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the
land." TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8.
5. This clause provides: "That excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." TENN. CONST. art. I, § 16.
6. This clause provides in pertinent part that "in all indictments for libel, the jury
shall have a right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in
other criminal cases." TENN. CONST. art. I, § 19.
7. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
8. 815 S.W.2d at 166.
9. Id. at 189 (quoting State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 210 (N.J. 1987) (citing
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 157), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2433 (1993)).
10. Id. at 190 (quoting State v. Barber, 753 S.W.2d 659, 670 (Tenn.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 900 (1988)).
11.
615 S.W.2d 126 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981).
12. See Keen, 1994 WL 198625, at *16; Nichols, 1994 WL 162134, at *14; Smith,

868 S.W.2d at 582; Howell, 868 S.W.2d at 258; Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d at 481; Hurley, 1994
WL 131554, at *14-*15; Bane, 853 S.W.2d at 489; Harris, 839 S.W.2d at 76; Evans, 838
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Justices Reid and Daughtrey, dissenting in Black, criticized the
majority's reliance on federal precedent on grounds that it had been13
formulated with little or no experience with death by electrocution.
Advocating the need to evaluate the method of execution in accordance with
"'evolving standards of decency, ""4 the dissenters argued that the case
should be remanded for the presentation of evidence on whether execution
by electrocution is cruel and unusual."
While the majority of the current Tennessee Supreme Court 6 has
upheld the death penalty against per se challenges, the court has held the
statute to be cruel and unusual when imposed for murder in the perpetration
8 the defendant was convicted
of a misdemeanor. 7 In State v. Hale,"
under the then existing version of the so-called Scotty Trexler law, 9 which
permitted the imposition of capital punishment for murder in perpetration of
child abuse. 20 Broadly interpreting the phrase "child abuse" to refer to the
misdemeanor statute identically entitled,2' a three-judge majority2 2 found
the death penalty to be disproportionate to the offense and hence, unconstitutional when applied to those who killed in the perpetration of a misdemeanor. 23 The dissenting justices, in order to avoid "constitutional
defect, ' ' 4 argued that the phrase "child abuse" in the statute actually
S.W.2d at 196.
13. 815 S.W.2d at 199-201 (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting, with whom
Daughtrey, J., joined).
14. Id. at 201 (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting, with whom Daughtrey, J.,
joined) (quoting Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1094 (1985) (mem.) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(plurality opinion))).
15. Id. at 199-201 (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting, with whom Daughtrey, J.,
joined).
16. The change in membership of the court due to Justice Daughtrey's appointment
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit does not affect the AndersonDrowota-O'Brien majority.
17. See Hale, 840 S.W.2d at 307.
18. Id.
19. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-202(a)(2) (Supp. 1988) (current version at TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(4) (Supp. 1993)). Scotty Trexler was an infant who died as a result of
child abuse inflicted by his mother's boyfriend, who was convicted of second-degree murder.
See State v. Bowers, C.C.A. No. 115, 1989 WL 86576, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 2,
1989). As a result of public outcry, the legislature passed a statute making murder in
perpetration of child abuse, murder in the first-degree and punishable by life imprisonment
or death. 840 S.W.2d at 310 n.3.
20. 840 S.W.2d at 308.
21. Id. at 310-12.
22. Justice Anderson authored the majority opinion, id. at 308, in which Justice
Daughtrey and Chief Justice Reid concurred, id. at 315.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 317 (Drowota, J., dissenting, with whom O'Brien, J., concurred).
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referred to the felony "aggravated child abuse" statute. 25 Interpreted this
way, the statute authorized the death penalty for murder in the perpetration
of a felony, not a misdemeanor, and was therefore not disproportionate.26
The Hale proportionality analysis set the stage for State v. Middlebrooks,27 the next death penalty case decided by the Tennessee Supreme
Court, and arguably the most significant. Middlebrooks was convicted of
felony murder and aggravated kidnapping. His death sentence was
prompted by the finding of two aggravating factors, one of which was that
the murder was committed in the perpetration of a felony enumerated in the
Tennessee first-degree murder statute.28 Middlebrooks challenged his death
sentence, arguing that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional.29
Although not raised by the parties, the court also addressed the issue of
whether the application of the death penalty in felony murder cases is per
se unconstitutional.30
A majority of the court rejected both per se contentions.3 Adopting
the federal standard32 for determining whether the culpable mental state is
sufficient to impose the death penalty,33 the majority rejected a per se
proportionality approach. 34 Instead, the court adopted a case-by-case
approach under the required statutory proportionality review 35 and concluded that imposing the death penalty for felony murder was not a per se
violation of Article I, Section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution.36
In the context of the Middlebrooks case, and presumably other felony
murder cases in which death is imposed by virtue of the felony murder

25. Id. Justice Drowota, writing for the dissent, argued that such an interpretation
was consistent with legislative intent and with the principle of statutory construction that
requires interpretation that renders statutes "constitutionally valid ... even though [a
construction that voids the statute] may initially seem more natural." Id. at 317 (Drowota,
J., dissenting, with whom O'Brien, J., concurred) (citing State v. Bobo, 727 S.W.2d 945, 955
(Tenn.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987)).
26. See id.
27. 840 S.W.2d at 317. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Middlebrooks but dismissed the case after oral argument. See 113 S. Ct. at 1840 (granting
certiorari), and 114 S. Ct. at 651 (dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted).
28. 840 S.W.2d at 322.
29. Id. at 335.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 335, 340-41.
32. The United States Supreme Court has upheld the death penalty in accomplice
liability cases in which one kills, attempts to kill, intends a killing, or is substantially
involved in an underlying felony and exhibits reckless disregard for life. Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
33. 840 S.W.2d at 337-38.
34. Id. at 340.
35. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206 (Supp. 1993).
36. 840 S.W.2d at 340-41.
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aggravating circumstance,37 three justices concluded that the broad
definition of felony murder,38 together with the duplicative language of the
aggravating circumstance, did not sufficiently narrow the class of deatheligible defendants.39
Consequently, Middlebrooks's death sentence
imposed for felony murder, when the aggravating circumstance was murder
committed during an aggravated kidnapping, was unconstitutional.'
However, because the jury concluded that an additional aggravating circumstance existed, the court was unable to determine whether inclusion of the
felony murder aggravator was harmless error and remanded the case for
resentencing.4"
This harmless error analysis previewed in Middlebrooks has assumed a
place of priority in post-Middlebrooks death penalty cases.
Since
Middlebrooks, a majority of the court has upheld death sentences under
harmless error review more often than not. In conducting that review, the
court examines "the number and strength of remaining valid aggravating
circumstances, the prosecutor's argument at sentencing, the evidence
admitted to establish the invalid aggravator, and the nature, quality and
strength of mitigating evidence."42
The application of that review to the circumstances of a given case has
produced some divergence of opinion. In a meticulous explanation of the
analysis, Chief Justice Reid,- in his dissent in State v. Nichols,43 found that
the record failed to support the conclusion reached by the majority that the

37.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(7) (Supp. 1993) (formerly TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 39-2-203(i)(7) (1982)).
38. For the current definition, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(2) (1991). In
effect at the time of the Middlebrooks case was the pre-1989 felony murder statute that
allowed the death penalty to be imposed solely because the killing took place during an
enumerated felony. See id. § 39-2-202(a)(1) (Supp. 1988). In 1989 the statute was amended
to require recklessness during the felony before a death sentence could be imposed. See id.
§ 39-13-202(2) (1991).
39. 840 S.W.2d at 346. The Eighth Amendment disallows a mandatory death penalty
for even very narrow classes of murderers. A state must narrow the reach of the death
penalty not only to certain offenses but also to certain offenders. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 879 (1983); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301, 303-04 (1976).
40. 840 S.W.2d at 346.
41. Id. at 347. In his dissent, Chief Justice Reid espoused the view that a harmless
error analysis was inappropriate when an aggravator was found to be invalid on appeal. Id.
at 354-55 (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting). In two later decisions, in which "there was
no evidence before a jury which could influence its decision," he held otherwise. Howell,
868 S.W.2d at 270 (Reid, C.J., concurring); see Smith, 868 S.W.2d at 583-85 (Reid, C.J.,
concurring). But see Nichols, 1994 WL 162134, at *20-*24 (Reid, C.J., dissenting).
42. Howell, 868 S.W.2d at 261.
43. 1994 WL 162134.
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State had "shown that beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury was not
influenced by the aggravating circumstance.""
At least one justice, Chief Justice Reid, addressed in Middlebrooks the
larger issue of whether imposing death as a sentence for a crime committed
with mere reckless intent was cruel and unusual.4 5 The Chief Justice
concluded that Article I, Section 16 imposed a higher standard than its
federal counterpart in that at least a "conscious purpose" to produce death,
or knowledge that it was likely to occur, must precede imposition of the
death penalty.46 Opting for a per se proportionality approach, Chief Justice
Reid challenged the majority's claim that the required statutory proportionality review assured sufficient narrowing of death-eligible defendants. He
found the majority's proportionality review to be conclusory and illogical.48
B. Law of the Land Clause
Article I, Section 8, containing Tennessee's law of the land clause, has
been deemed synonymous with the Federal Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses and is another Tennessee constitutional provision
frequently raised by those challenging the death penalty. Its provisions were
used to mount an attack of the child abuse murder statute at issue in the
case of State v. Hale.49 There, a majority of the court concluded that due
process was violated because conviction under the statute included a
determination that the accused was also guilty of prior uncharged incidents

44. Id. at *23. Complicating the issue in the Nichols case was the jury's return of
the death penalty verdict form citing four nonstatutory aggravating circumstances detailing
the nature of the murder, but citing no statutory aggravating circumstance concerning the
prior convictions. Id. at *6-*7.
45. 840 S.W.2d at 350-55 (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting, with whom
Daughtrey, J., concurred).
46. Id. at 353 (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting, with whom Daughtrey, J.,
concurred).
47. Id. at 354 (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting, with whom Daughtrey, J.,
concurred).
48. Id. The Chief Justice has continued to criticize the statutory proportionality
review employed by the majority as being pro forma and superficial. See Nichols, 1994 WL
162134, at *24 (Reid, C.J., dissenting); Smith, 868 S.W.2d at 585 (Reid, C.J., concurring);
Howell, 868 S.W.2d at 271-73 (Reid, C.J., concurring); Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d at 484 (Reid,
C.J., concurring and dissenting); Branam, 855 S.W.2d at 570-71 (Reid, C.J., joining in the
majority opinion). Justice O'Brien addressed this argument when raised in Keen by referring
to State v. Barber, 753 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900 (1988), in which the
court compared a number of cases and Supreme Court Rule 12, which requires that a trial
judge file a report with the supreme court in all first degree murder cases. Keen, 1994 WL
198625, at *18; see TENN. SUP. CT. R. 12.
49. 840 S.W.2d at 307.
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of misdemeanor child abuse. 5° Utilizing prior uncharged crimes to
establish guilt amounted to a violation of the right to a jury trial and the
right to be tried upon an indictment returned by a grand jury, consequently
violating Article I, Section 8." The two dissenting justices analogized the
procedure to that required to prove felony murder and concluded that the
constitution required only that every element of an offense, including a prior
pattern of conduct, be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 2
Article I, Section 8 was also the partial basis for a claim that a jury
verdict poll that excluded the words "beyond a reasonable doubt" was
unconstitutional. In State v. Nichols,53 the court rejected the claim that the
failure to inquire whether each juror found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt
violated the federal and state constitutions.5 4
C. Jury's Right to Determine Law Clause
Another frequently used, yet infertile, provision for death penalty
challengers is Article I, Section 19. The last sentence of that section
provides that "in all indictments for libel, the jury shall have a right to
determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in other
criminal cases."5 5 The word "criminal" was added in 1835 to clarify that
the section applied to criminal libel and not civil libel cases.56
Death penalty challengers have urged the Tennessee Supreme Court to
find that the death penalty statute violates this section of the constitution by
requiring the imposition of a death sentence after a jury finds that the
aggravating circumstances proven beyond a reasonable doubt outweigh any
mitigating circumstances."s No member of the court has accepted this
argument. The court has reasoned that Article I, Section 19 was never
intended to apply to the sentencing phase of capital cases.5

50. Id. at 313.
51. Id. The majority cited Bobo, 727 S.W.2d at 945, as support. 840 S.W.2d at 31314. In Bobo, the Tennessee Supreme Court invalidated the introduction of evidence of
untried, charged murders in the sentencing phase as aggravating circumstances violative of
both state and Federal Constitutions. 727 S.W.2d at 952.
52. 840 S.W.2d at 315-16 (Drowota, J.,dissenting, with whom O'Brien, J.,
concurred).
53. 1994 WL 162134.
54. Id. at * 14. Nichols challenged the polling procedure under the Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and under Article I, Sections 8,
9, and 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. Id.
55. TENN. CONST. art. 1,§ 19.
56.

LEWIS L. LASKA, THE TENNESSEE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE

53 (1990).
57. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(g) (Supp. 1993).
58. Black, 815 S.W.2d at 187.

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:733

Thus the most successful state constitutional challenge for death penalty
opponents has been based upon Article I, Section 16, the Tennessee cruel
and unusual punishment provision. While per se challenges have been
consistently rejected by a majority, individual disproportionality challenges
have captured the court's attention.
II. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
The death penalty cases decided by the Tennessee Supreme Court since
September 1990 have contained discussions of seven of the twelve
aggravating circumstances enumerated in our death penalty statute. 59 Of
the seven aggravators addressed, the felony murder aggravator 6 and the
"heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator6' have received the most attention.
A. Felony Murder Aggravator
In State v. Middlebrooks,62 the court decided that the use of the felony
murder aggravator to impose the death penalty on one convicted of felony
murder was essentially a "duplication of the elements of the offense" of first
degree murder, and consequently insufficiently narrowed the class of deatheligible murderers.6 3 In reversing the death sentence in Middlebrooks, the

majority held that, in light of the finding by the jury of only one other
aggravator, the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'
In
subsequent cases the harmless error analysis has resulted in remands for

59. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i) (Supp. 1993).
60. See id. § 39-13-204(i)(7). Specifically, this aggravator now applies to murder
"committed while the defendant was engaged in committing, or was an accomplice in the
commission of, or was attempting to commit, or was fleeing after committing or attempting
to commit" any of the enumerated felonies. Id.
61. See id. § 39-13-204(i)(5). Specifically, this aggravator, as amended, applies to
an "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel [murder] in that it involved torture or serious
physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death." Id. The aggravator read otherwise
when applied in many of the cases. See id. § 39-2-203(i)(5) (1982) (amended 1989).
Formerly, the statute applied if "[tihe murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in
that it involved torture or depravity of mind." Cases applying the 1982 version of the statute
include Smith, 868 S.W.2d at 579 & n.3; Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d at 478-80; Caughron, 855
S.W.2d at 542-44; Bane, 853 S.W.2d at 484, 489; Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 331; Harris,
839 S.W.2d at 76; and Black, 815 S.W.2d at 181-82. See also Hurley, 1994 WL 131554,
at * 15 ("The heinous, atrocious and cruel nature of the killing was in evidence, but was not
charged to the jury and not formally found."). Instructing the jury as to the wrong version
of this aggravator was one reason for the reversal and remand for a new sentencing hearing
in Keen.
62. 840 S.W.2d at 317.
63. Id. at 341.
64. Id. at 346-47.
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resentencing and affirmances in light of other factors found.65 While it
initially appeared that at least one member of the court would not employ
harmless error analysis, 6 6 two recent opinions by a unanimous court,
employing harmless error analysis, upheld the imposition of the death
sentence in which the felony murder aggravator was found.6 7
A different issue under the felony murder aggravator arose in a recent
death penalty case, State v. Terry.6" In that case, the court found an
insufficient nexus to warrant use of the felony murder aggravator when the
proof did not establish that the victim was killed in the course of a
larceny.69
B. Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel Aggravator
The second most divisive aggravator for the court has been the "heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" aggravator. 70 The ambiguity of this aggravator, as
previously written, caused at least two justices to criticize its use.7' Calling
the definition of "depravity" utilized by the court a "slight expansion of a
circle of synonyms," the dissenting justices carefully scrutinized findings of
depravity and torture and urged the adoption of a standard, clear defini7
tion.
'
Additionally,
the a dissenters
suggested
ofother
this
aggravator,
which requires
purposelesshave
killing,
precludesthat
the use
use of

65. See Smith, 857 S.W.2d at 25; Bane, 853 S.W.2d at 490; Evans, 838 S.W.2d at
196; see also supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
66. See Black, 815 S.W.2d at 198 (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting, with whom
Daughtrey, J., joined).
67. See Smith, 868 S.W.2d at 561; Howell, 868 S.W.2d at 238.
68. 813 S.W.2d at 420.
69. Id. at 424. Terry, a pastor, committed several acts of larceny and developed an
elaborate plan to disappear with a new identity. Id. at 421. He then killed, decapitated, and
dismembered a church handyman and set the church on fire in an effort to convince
authorities of his own death. Id. The last incident of larceny occurred four days before the
murder. Id. at 422. The murder victim was not a witness to the larceny, nor did he expose
it, try to stop it, or interfere with it. Id. at 424.
70. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(5) (Supp. 1993); see also supra note 60.
71. Justices Reid and Daughtrey in three cases have launched attacks on this
aggravator. See Black, 815 S.W.2d at 195-97 (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting, with
whom Daughtrey, J., joined); Harris,839 S.W.2d at 83-84 (Reid, C.J., dissenting, with whom
Daughtrey, J., joined); Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d at 483 (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting);
id. at 485-90 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). In Van Tran, a case involving the aggravator as it
was written prior to amendment, Justice Daughtrey applauded the legislative change. Id. at
487 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
72. See Harris, 839 S.W.2d at 83 (Reid, C.J., dissenting, with whom Daughtrey, J.,
joined).
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aggravators-which
by definition imply a purpose in the killing-in the
73
same case.

The majority of the court has evaluated this aggravator on the facts of
each individual case in multiple-murder situations. In State v. Van Tran,74
the court analyzed the means and method of each of three murders with
which the defendant was charged in order to ascertain whether the killings
were cruel and depraved, and found sufficient evidence to support the
finding in only one of the three instances in which the death sentence was
imposed.75
More recently, the confusion over the changed statutory wording of this
aggravator was among the reasons that led the court to reverse a death
sentence and remand for resentencing. In State v. Keen,76 a unanimous
court reversed and remanded for resentencing when the trial court incorrectly instructed on the pre-1989 cruel and heinous aggravator and standard of
proof for imposition of the death penalty.77 Again, however, the court
rejected the argument that the aggravator was overbroad and vague.78
C. Avoidance of Arrest And Prosecution Aggravator
Several multiple-homicide cases decided since 1990 have involved the
use of the avoidance of arrest and prosecution aggravator.79 In these cases
the jury is asked to find that the second or subsequent killing was for the
purpose of eliminating witnesses to the first killing and thereby, for the

73. For example, the dissenters criticized the apparent inconsistency in a jury finding
of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator, coupled with either the finding of the murder
to avoid arrest and prosecution aggravator, Black, 815 S.W.2d at 197 (Reid, C.J., concurring
and dissenting, with whom Daughtrey, J., joined), or the enumerated felony murder
aggravator, Smith, 857 S.W.2d at 25 (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 25-26
(Daughtrey, J., concurring and dissenting).
74. 864 S.W.2d at 465.
75. Id. at 478-80.
76. 1994 WL 198625.
77. Id. at *8-*9. Before 1989, the death penalty could be imposed if the jury found
that no mitigating circumstances were sufficiently substantial to balance or outweigh the
statutory aggravating circumstances. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(g) (1982) (amended
1989) (current version at id. § 39-13-204(g)(2)(B) (Supp. 1993)). The 1989 amendment
allowed the impositing of a death penalty only after a jury finding "that the state has proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory aggravating circumstance[s] ... outweigh any
mitigating circumstances." Id. § 39-13-204(g)(2)(B) (Supp. 1993). A mistaken use of the
prior standard also caused the invalidation of the death sentence in Stephenson, 1994 WL
175096.
78. Keen, 1994 WL 198625, at *16.
79. This aggravator specifically applies when "[t]he murder was committed for the
purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the
defendant or another." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(6) (Supp. 1993).

1994]

DEATH PENALTY CASES

purpose of avoiding apprehension or arrest.8" Though not yet raised, this
aggravator may also be attacked as duplicative and as providing insufficient
narrowing since arguably all murder victims are witnesses to their own
attempted murder or aggravated assault before they die.
D. Mass Murder Aggravator
In multiple-homicide cases the court also has been called upon to
construe the mass murder aggravator." While a majority of the court has
found that the aggravator applies to double or triple homicides committed
in a relatively brief time period,8 2 dissenting justices have argued that the
legislative history demonstrates that the aggravator was intended to apply
only to serial murders.8 3 In State v. Van Tran,84 dissenting Chief Justice
Reid found this aggravator to be inconsistent with the jury's rejection of
both the premeditated, deliberated murder count and the "knowingly created
a great risk of death" aggravator.85 As such, the Chief Justice deemed the
aggravator to insufficiently narrow the field of death-eligible defendants.86
In the recent case of State v. Smith,87 Chief Justice Reid continued to reject
the mass murder aggravator in the context of triple homicides committed
close in time and proximity, but found the error to be harmless since the
evidence substantiating the aggravator was otherwise admissible.88
E. Other Aggravators
Three other aggravators were discussed generally by the court in five of
the death penalty cases to come before it. The first aggravator, victim less
than twelve years of age, was present in State v. Hale89 and State v.
Keen,9" but because of reversal on other grounds, was not elaborated upon.
The second aggravator, previous violent felonies, escaped thorough

80. See Smith, 868 S.W.2d at 580-81; Branam, 855 S.W.2d at 570; Evans, 838
S.W.2d at 188.
81. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(12) (Supp. 1993).
82. See Smith, 868 S.W.2d at 581-82; Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d at 478; Black, 815
S.W.2d at 182-83.
83. See, e.g., Black, 815 S.W.2d at 197 (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting, with
whom Daughtrey, J., joined).
84. 864 S.W.2d at 465.
85. Id. at 483 (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis omitted); see TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(3) (Supp. 1993).
86. Id. at 484 (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
87. 868 S.W.2d at 561.
88. Id. at 583-84 (Reid, C.J., concurring).
89. 840 S.W.2d at 308; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (i)(1) (Supp. 1993).
90. 1994 WL 198625.
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discussion in two cases,9 but formed the basis for a constitutional challenge in a third.92
The third aggravator, murder for remuneration, was analyzed in State v.
Stephenson.93 Stephenson argued that the aggravator was unconstitutional
when employed in a first-degree murder case based on criminal responsibility for soliciting murder94 because it failed to sufficiently narrow the
number of death-eligible defendants.95 While the majority rejected the
argument, the dissent, relying on Middlebrooks, agreed that the aggravator
did not sufficiently narrow because the same acts constituted the criminal
offense and the aggravating circumstance, thus rendering the aggravator
invalid.96 The chief justice concluded that the majority had abandoned
Middlebrooks in its analysis, which 6nly invalidated aggravators that failed
to narrow and duplicated essential elements of the offense, but did not
invalidate an aggravator that only failed to narrow. 97
In State v.
Hutchison,9 8 the chief justice dissented and found defendant ineligible for
the death penalty on the same grounds. 99
Two related arguments regarding the use of aggravating circumstances
have recently been rejected by the court. In State v. Keen,' ° the defendant claimed that when viewed in combination, the (1) felony murder, (2)
heinous, atrocious, or cruel, (3) avoidance of arrest and prosecution, and (4)
previous violent felonies "encompass the majority of homicides committed
in this State," and therefore do not sufficiently narrow the class of deatheligible defendants.'0 ' The court found the unsupported argument unpersuasive. °2 Similarly, in State v. Nichols, °3 the defendant challenged the
order in which the prosecution tried the cases, alleging that this created the
additional aggravator of previous violent felonies.' 4 The court rejected
the argument and held that "the order [of commission] is irrelevant so long
as the convictions have been entered before the sentencing hearing at which

91. See Howell, 868 S.W.2d at 243; Harris,839 S.W.2d at 59 & n.l; see also TENN.
§ 39-13-204(i)(2) (Supp. 1993).
92. See Nichols, 1994 WL 162134, at *13-*14.
93. 1994 WL 175096.
94. Stephenson was criminally responsible for the murder of his wife because he
solicited another to kill
her. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-402(2) (1991).
95. 1994 WL 175096, at *29.
96. Id. at *30 (Reid,C.J., concurring and dissenting).
97. Id. at *32 (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
98. 1994 WL 242632.
99. Id. at *14 (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
100. 1994 WL 198625.
101. Id. at *16.
102. Id.
103. 1994 WL 162134.
104. Id. at *13.
CODE ANN.
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they were introduced.""1 5 In the face of Nichols's due process and equal
protection challenges, the court concluded that this aggravator was subject
to a certain degree of "prosecutorial discretion," which did not create any
constitutional infirmity.10 6 In addition, the court found no merit to
Nichols's argument that his prior convictions could not form the basis for
the prior violent felonies aggravator simply because no final judgment of
conviction had been entered.0 7
CONCLUSION

The Tennessee Supreme Court, though divided, has upheld our state
death penalty statute despite several constitutional and statutory challenges.
Those decisions bind the court of criminal appeals which now has jurisdiction over the direct appeals of death penalty cases. Notwithstanding these
precedents and others in the seventeen-year history of the Tennessee death
penalty statute, new challenges undoubtedly will arise as a result of the
evolving state and federal constitutional principles.

105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *15.

